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VOIR DIRE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: PROTECTING
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the criminal defendant the right to be tried by an "impartial jury."' This
right has been secured in the federal courts by granting the defendant and
the prosecutor the opportunity to request the exclusion of certain prospec-
tive jurors through challenges for cause or peremptory challenges.2 In
order that the parties may intelligently exercise these challenges, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for an examination of pro-
spective jurors known as the voir dire.' The Rules leave the trial court
1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, .
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2. Challenges for cause are unlimited in number, but are available only where a
party can show legally cognizable evidence of partiality. Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965). Peremptory challenges permit the parties to have a limited number
of prospective jurors excused "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control." Id. at 220. While the right to challenge jurors
for cause is mandated by the sixth amendment, Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1950), the peremptory challenge has not been thought to be so required.
However,
[t]he persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate the
long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of
trial by jury. . . . Although "[tihere is nothing in the Constitution of
the United States which requires the Congress . . . to grant peremptory
challenges," . . . nonetheless the challenge is "one of the most important
of the rights secured to the accused," .
Swain v. Alabama, supra at 219.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regulate the number of peremptory
challenges available to each party:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory
challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges.
If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one
year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If
there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants
additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or
jointly.
FED. R. ClUm. P. 24(b).
3. The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney
for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may
itself conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the
defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. Cmis. P. 24(a).
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wide discretion in conducting the voir dire.4 The vast majority of federal
district judges have exercised this discretion to conduct the entire exam-
ination themselves.' This is unlike the practice in many states, where
counsel actively participate in the voir dire.6 This note will measure
court-conducted voir dire against the constitutional goal of an impartial
jury' and suggest reforms which would better achieve the objective.
4. The Rules provide no standards for deciding how extensive the examination
should be, what questions should be asked, what questions are inappropriate, under
what circumstances counsel should be allowed to conduct the examination, or on what
grounds the court may refuse to ask questions submitted by the parties.
5. A survey of federal court voir dire practices showed that in 51 districts judges
conduct the entire voir dire, in 22 districts both the judge and counsel examine the
jury and in 12 districts the voir dire is conducted entirely by counsel. Report of the
Judticial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, The Jury System
in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Con-
ference].
Challenges to court-conducted voir dire based on the alleged unconstitutionality
of Rule 24(a) have been unsuccessful. United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.
1971) ; Rodgers v. United States, 402 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1968).
6. The federal rule is followed in about ten states; approximately the same
number provide for examination only by the judge; in 22 states provision
is made for examination by the judge and the attorneys, and in the other states
examination is left to counsel.
A.B.A. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY 63 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. ADVISORY COmMITTEE].
7. An impartial jury is not a wholly attainable objective. Impartiality is only
one of the many legal fictions surrounding the operation of our jury system. Jurors
are expected to recall at the trial's end all the testimony they have heard and the
exhibits they have seen, often without even being permitted to take notes. They are
expected to disregard all evidence stricken from the record as inadmissable and to
apply certain facts to one issue while disregarding them with respect to another.
Jurors are required not to reach a decision until they have heard all the evidence.
They are presumed to understand and apply the law as given by the court in its in-
structions. See Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. CHI. L.
REv. 386 (1954).
Realizing the impossibility of attaining absolute impartiality, some authorities
have suggested that the goal be abandoned in favor of court procedures designed to
achieve a "randomly biased" jury representing a cross-section of the community.
Blauner, Sociology in the Courtroom: The Search for White Racism in the Voir
Dire in MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS: THE VOIR DIRE CONIUCTED BY CHARLES
R. GARRY IN PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA V. HUEY P. NEWTON 69 (A. Ginger ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as MINIMIZING RACISM]; Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Ex-
pediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 925 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Expediting Voir Dire] ; Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its
Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEo. L.J. 839, 843 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Okun]. There is, however, evidence that a randomly biased jury will produce, not a
verdict based on the evidence, but a verdict based on juror prejudices. One empirical
study of a jurisdiction with the practice of having only a short, perfunctory voir
dire revealed that in a large number of cases the verdict reached had been substantially
influenced by unrevealed biases of individual jurors. Broeder, Voir Dire Examina-
tions: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
-Empirical Study]. Thus, although courts may recognize that the goal of absolute
impartiality is not achievable, it is their duty under the "impartial" requirement of
the sixth amendment to make all reasonable efforts to eliminate juror prejudice.
270
VOIR DIRE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
COURT-CONDUCTED VOIR DIRE-PURPOSES AND PROBLEMS
The Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the jury
System has recommended that court-conducted voir dire be adopted by all
federal courts.' Those who support court-conducted voir dire are pri--
marily concerned with saving time.' One study found that court-con-
ducted voir dire averaged 64 minutes, while counsel questioning averaged
111 minutes.'" A secondary argument of those favoring examination by
the trial judge is that questioning by the court "improves the character"
of voir dire." Voir dire examinations conducted wholly by counsel have
been widely reported to include serious improprieties. Lawyers have
been criticized for using voir dire to influence the entire panel in order to
obtain a favorably inclined jury 3 and for "preinstructing" jurors on the
facts or law involved in the case.'" A content analysis of voir dire has
shown that attorneys spend the bulk of their time preparing prospective
jurors for the case and less than half of the time selecting jurors.'"
S. Judicial Conference, supra note 5, at 424. Court-conducted voir dire has
also been endorsed by a number of other authorities. A.B.A. ADVISORY COmmITTEE,
supra note 6, at 63; A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALI-
rICATIONS AND SELECTION (1956) [hereinafter cited as VANDERBILT); Expediting
Voir Dire, spra note 7; Comment, Voir Dire Examination-Court or Counsel, 11
ST. Louis U. L.J. 234 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
9. VANDERBILT, supra note 8, at 73; Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at
956; Judicial Conference, supra note 5, at 467; Comment, supra note 8, at 248. How-
ever, this goal has been criticized for its insensitivity toward basic rights. Okun,
supra note 7, at 849 n.40.
10. Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 948. But see DEvir & BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AND CRIMINiAL § 3.01, at 49 (2d
ed. 1970) (no significant difference found).
11. Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 950; Judicial Conference, vupra note
5, at 467.
12. See, e.g., Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 942-44; Comment, supra
note 8, at 241-45; Note, Voir Dire-Prevention of Prejudicial Questioning, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 1088, at 1092-95 (1966).
Commentary critical of counsel voir dire has largely been based on observations
of civil trials. The major empirical study comparing voir dire methods, Expediting
Voir Dire, supra note 7, included only civil trials, yet its conclusion recommended
court-conducted voir dire for both civil and criminal trials. Here, as elsewhere,
insufficient attention was given to the question whether the disparate nature of civil
and criminal trials necessitates different methods of jury selection.
13. VANDERBILT, supra note 8, at 73; Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at
942-44; Okun, supra note 7, at 842.
14. Expediting Voir Dire, supra note 7, at 943-44. One study found voir dire
to be an extremely effective mechanism for "indoctrinating" the jurors. Empirical
Study, supra note 7, at 522. The use of voir dire to convey instructions on the law
need not be viewed as illegitimate. Consider, for example, how effectively the pre-
sumption of innocence is conveyed at voir dire where each prospective juror is
personally addressed and affirms his acceptance of the presumption before hearing
any of the evidence. Using voir dire for instructions is certainly more effective than
the mechanical recitation of a long series of pattern instructions at the end of trial.
15. H. ZEISEL, H. KALvENi & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS 103 n.9
(1959).
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However, while court-conducted voir dire may be successful in elim-
inating the problems posed by uncontrolled counsel voir dire, voir dire
conducted wholly by the trial judge introduces problems of its own which
may inhibit the constitutional right of the accused to have his case heard
before an impartial jury. These problems include (1) the inadequacy
of appellate review of voir dire; (2) the ineffectiveness of a limited exam-
ination in disclosing juror prejudices likely to have a substantial impact
upon the verdict; and (3) the encouragement of outside investigation of
jurors where the voir dire examination is excessively limited.
The objective of voir dire is to discover prejudice and thereby assure
impartiality,"0 but if the voir dire is inadequate, appellate review will
provide no cure for the defendant and few guidelines to future litigants.
Since Rule 24(a) grants the trial court wide discretion in conducting the
examination of prospective jurors, the defendant is only entitled to re-
versal on appeal if he can demonstrate that the court's conduct was both
an abuse of discretion" -and prejudicial error.18 The abuse of discretion
standard affords unusually weak protection to an important constitutional
right. Appellate courts have often labeled a trial judge's examination
improper or inadequate while declining to find it so inappropriate as to
constitute an abuse of discretion. 9 Even if considered an abuse of dis-
cretion, errors on voir dire cannot be easily proven prejudicial" because
16. See notes 1-3 supra & text accompanying.
17. Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970); Silverthorne v.
United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971);
Kreuter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1015
(1968) ; Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920
(1959) ; Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1955).
18. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 640 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1022 (1971). See also United States v. Rivers, 468 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1972)
(although the defendant had the right to question jurors about racial prejudice, a denial
of that right may be harmless error).
19. United States v. Mattin, 419 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1970); Kreuter v. United
States, 376 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. "denied, 390 U.S. 1015 (1968); Pope v.
United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651
(1968); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876
(1955). Appellate courts have explained the need to rely on the judgment of the
trial judge in voir dire decisions on the basis that he is in the best position to evaluate
the jurors' demeanor and determine whether the prospective jurors can be fair and
impartial. See, e.g., United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1972). However,
an unexpressed explanation for the hesitancy to reverse for voir dire errors might be
the natural reluctance to discard the results of an entire trial because of errors which
occurred before the testimony even began.
20. However, when a court has found the trial court's conduct of voir dire clearly
in error, the requirement of proving that the error was prejudicial can be easily
evaded. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 640 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971) ; New England Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 400 F.2d 58, 69 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969) ; Lurding v.
United States, 179 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1950).
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the secrecy which surrounds jury deliberations prevents the appellate court
from discovering whether the jury was in fact biased.
The opinions of those appellate courts which have reviewed voir dire
examinations provide little guidance for the trial judge who might be in-
terested in determining the limits of his discretion and little support for
the defendant asserting his right to an impartial jury. With few excep.
tions, 1 the Supreme Court has not given the lower courts any specific
standards for voir dire questioning, and has regularly refused to resolve
the inconsistencies among circuit court decisions in the area.22 Even a
21. In Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931), the Court held that a
Negro defendant on trial for the murder of a white policeman was entitled to have
the jurors asked on voir dire whether they had any racial prejudices which would
prevent a fair and impartial verdict. In Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950),
the Court reversed the conviction of the defendant for failure to produce documents
before the House Un-American Activities Committee where the trial court had not
permitted the defendant to interrogate government employees on the jury panel with
specific reference to the effect of the "Loyalty Order" on their ability to render an
impartial verdict.
The Supreme Court recently missed an opportunity to clarify the law in this
area when it ruled unanimously that a criminal defendant in a state court had the
right to have the court examine jurors on voir dire as to possible prejudice arising
from the fact that the defendant was a Negro. Ham v. South Carolina, - U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 848 (1973). Not only does the opinion by Justice Rehnquist fail to clarify
the constitutional standards for voir dire, but it succeeds in further clouding the issue
by reinterpreting Aldridge and failing to cite other decisions which seem to conflict
with that new interpretation. Justice Rehnquist describes Aldridge as "not expressly
grounded upon any constitutional requirement," id. at - , 93 S. Ct. at 850, and implies
that the decision might be based on the general supervisory powers of the Supreme
Court over the federal courts and not on the Constitution. Id. at - , 93 S. Ct. at
850-51. Although it is true that the Aldridge opinion does not refer specifically to any
single constitutional provision, the opinion repeatedly uses the word "impartial," as
in the sixth amendment, to explain the goal that voir dire should achieve. Justice
Rehnquist does not mention any of the previous Supreme Court opinions that clearly
grounded voir dire decisions on the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.
See, e.g., Mforford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950); Dennis v. United States,
339 U.S. 162 (1950). Of the three opinions written in the Ham case, only Justice
Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, mentions that voir dire is based
on the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.
22. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit has twice reversed for the
failure to ask jurors if they would give greater weight to the testimony of a law
enforcement officer merely because he was an officer. Brown v. United States,
338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir.
1959). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, however, considered the refusal to ask the
same question not to be error. United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970) ;
Fredrick v. United States, 163 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 775 (1947).
The Tenth Circuit found fault with a defendant's proposed wording of the same
question and consequently found no error in the trial court's refusal to ask it. Chavez
v. United States, 258 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916 (1959).
In Chavez, the Tenth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's directive that an other-
wise proper question should not be refused merely because it has been misphrased by
counsel. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311 (1931).
A review of the cases finding the omission of questions to be reversible error
provides no standards for determining which questions need be included on voir dire.
Cases where counsel's question was designed to reveal a relevant prejudice present no
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trial judge examining only the decisions of his own circuit will receive
little guidance because the opinions often state only the conclusion, "no
abuse of discretion," without giving any indication of the basis for the
decision.2"
A court-conducted voir dire is also likely to be inadequate to secure
an impartial jury since the questioning is usually too limited to disclose
the prejudices of the prospective jurors. Once a person has been unsuc-
cessful in avoiding jury duty he would probably prefer being seated as a
juror to spending his time in jury assembly rooms,24 so he is not likely to
volunteer information which might disqualify him,2" and he may even lie
in order to avoid being excused." A voir dire examination must be
difficulty. In such circumstances reversal is clearly in order. See, e.g., United States
v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970) (reversal for failure to ask about racial
prejudice) ; Smith v. United States, 262 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1958) (reversal for failure
to go beyond general racial prejudice and inquire specifically about Ku Klmx Klan
membership). See also United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversal
for failure to ask about juror association with organizations employing the chief
government witnesses); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971) (reversal for failure to inquire specifically about
juror exposure to pretrial publicity); Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1967) (reversal for failure to ask if the jurors were acquainted with a government
witness). There have, however, also been reversals for seemingly less significant
omissions. In a civil case, with the same "abuse of discretion" standard, a verdict
was reversed for failure to use questions submitted by counsel concerning jurors'
opinions about casualty insurance. Kiernan v. VanSchaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
In a tax evasion case where some of the defendant's income was derived from an
illegal "handbook" (bookie) operation on his property, the circuit court ruled that the
defendant was entitled to inquire of jurors whether they were opposed to the use
of handbooks, even though such use was illegal. Lurding v. United States, 179 F.2d
419 (6th Cir. 1950). In a prosecution for impersonation of a Veteran's Administration
official the appellate court reversed for the trial court's failure to ask jurors if they
would be prejudiced against the defendant because he was an admitted liar. United
States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965).
23. See, e.g., Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Beneke, 449 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Hawkins v. United States, 434 F.2d
738 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rabb, 394 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1968); Kreuter
v. United States, 376 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1015 (1968).
24. Empirical Study, supra note 7, at 526.
25. Broeder gives an example from a narcotics trial where the young son of one
of the jurors had only a week before been offered drugs by a professional peddler.
The juror was conscious of the bias that incident had created, yet he failed to dis-
close it. He told the interviewer later, "At several points during the trial, I felt like
standing up and disqualifying myself." The juror's sense of guilt induced bizarre
behavior in the jury room where he voted for acquittal on the first ballot to show
"impartiality" even though he was strongly for conviction. Empirical Study, supra
note 7, at 512.
26. A larceny case observed by Broeder provides an excellent example of con-
cealment and its potential effect on verdicts. One juror who was a friend and great
admirer of defense counsel admitted on voir dire only a casual acquaintance and
said, "I know him to speak to, but that won't influence me." Her comment, however,
was contradicted by her behavior in the jury room where she argued for acquittal
on the grounds that her friend, the defense counsel, "would never defend a guilty
man." Empirical Study, supra note 7, at 511.
170IR DIRE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
thorough and probing to overcome a venireman's strong desire to conceal
disqualifying personal information.
There are a number of reasons for believing that questioning by
counsel is more effective in overcoming this barrier than questioning by
the trial judge. It is likely that the judge, not having an adversarial
interest in the trial, will tend to ask general questions whose desired
answer is evident, rather than specific questions that might reveal infor-
nation on which to base a challenge." An attorney is more apt to have
the tenacity to discover prejudice instead of being satisfied with pro forma
affirmations of impartiality." Another advantage of counsel participation
27. In Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1022 (1971), a case involving substantial pre-trial publicity, the trial court
had only asked the jurors if they could be impartial despite any pre-trial publicity
they might have heard. The circuit court found that the voir dire "did not adequately
dispel the probability of prejudice accruing from the pre-trial publicity," 400 F.2d at
638, since the questions had been calculated to evoke subjective assessments of thejuror's own partiality and the examination too general to adequately probe the pre-
judice issue. Id. The court directed that in such cases each juror, out of the presence
of other members of the panel, should be asked specifically about what he had heard
about the case.
In Smith v. United States, 262 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1958), the court found a general
question about prejudice inadequate and reversed for failure to inquire specifically
if jurors were members of the Ku Klux Klan. The court agreed with the argument
of the appellants that "the right to challenge would be empty if the right to question
as to material facts is abridged." Id. at 51.
28. An excellent example of this is provided by Charles R. Garry's voir dire
in the Huey Newton murder trial where a prospective juror was being questioned
about his acceptance of the presumption of innocence. As the following excerpt shows,
the juror repeatedly responded affirmatively to the judge's lofty phrases about the
judicial system, but only to Mr. Garry's more direct questions did he indicate that he
really could not accept the fact that the defendant was innocent until proven guilty.
THE COURT: Now . . . it is the law of the United States and of the
State of California that a defendant charged with a crime is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is established beyond and to the exclusion of every
reasonable doubt. Do you understand what that means?
THE JUROR: (Juror nods head affirmatively.)
THE COURT: Now, if that is the case, you must - before you hear any
evidence at all - you must start on the theory and believe that this man is
innocent. But as soon as they produce proof which satisfies you beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is guilty, then you can feel otherwise. Do you
understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
,Rf. GARRY: But you are not willing, Mr. Strauss, as you have already
stated, to accept the fact that Huey Newton is absolutely innocent as he sits
right now, are you, sir?
A. Well, that's a question I can't answer before I hear the evidence.
Voir Dire by Defense (Extracts), in MIXIMIZING RAcISM, supra note 7, at 92-3.
MR. GARRY: As Huey Newton sits here next to me now, in your opinion
is he absolutely innocent?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't believe it, do you?
A. No.
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in voir dire is that, unlike the judge, trial attorneys are familiar with
facts of the case which may present important areas for inquiry. 9
IFinally, the authority and imposing appearance of the judge may awe
prospective jurors into giving what they think is the appropriate response
rather than the candid one. A venireman being examined on voir dire by
the court may feel that his own integrity is on trial"0 and phrase the
answers accordingly. The informality of questioning by trial counsel is
better calculated to put the prospective juror at ease and induce greater
spontaneity and candor.
These limitations on a court's ability to elicit information may lead
to more serious problems as the parties seek elsewhere the information
which they need to effectively exercise their right to challenge jurors.
Outside investigation of veniremen can threaten the integrity of the judi-
cial process and make each party's opportunity to have an impartial jury
rest on its investigative resources. The courts facilitate investigations
since in most federal districts jury lists are available to counsel well in
advance of trial."' Private counsel may subscribe to a commercial juror
investigation service, employ a detective agency, or have investigators
permanently attached to the attorney's staff. Government counsel make
use of the investigatory services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Internal Revenue Service and local police departments. 2
Outside investigations of prospective jurors may seriously com-
promise the judicial system's ability to give criminal defendants a fair
trial. When jurors are aware that they have been investigated their fear
or resentment of the investigating party may influence their verdict.88
If the inadequacies of court-conducted voir dire result in outside investi-
THE COURT: Challenge is allowed.
Id. at 94.
29. Although under Rule 24(a) counsel are entitled to submit suggested questions
to the court, the court is under no obligation to ask the recommended questions and
its refusal to do so is not generally subject to effective review. See text accompanying
notes 17-23 supra.
30. United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1972). Broeder's
post-trial interviews with jurors revealed that "most felt being challenged would ad-
versely reflect upon their ability to be fair and impugn their good faith." Empirical
Study, supra note 7, at 526. When asked individually on voir dire the seemingly
innocuous question, "Can you be fair and impartial?" the jurors were "almost uni-
formly resentful and felt that their integrity had been brought into question." Id. at
526-27.
31. Okun, supra note 7, at 849. However, federal statute only requires that jury
lists be released in advance of trial to those charged with treason or other capital
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970).
32. Okun, supra note 7, at 851-54.
33. As one juror reported, "I felt they must have been spying on us for a
month. That didn't help the defendant one bit, I can tell you that." Empirical Study,
supra note 7, at 526.
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gations, the court may be permitting and even encouraging undue inva-
sions of the privacy of prospective jurors. When there is public knowl-
edge of the prevalence of pre-trial investigations, citizens may become
even more determined to avoid jury service, further limiting the repre-
sentativeness of the pool from which trial jurors may be drawn.
Despite the threats to the integrity of the judicial system posed by
pre-trial investigation of jurors, the courts generally have not prohibited
or even condemned the practice. In one early case, a conviction was re-
versed because the court clerk had sent questionnaires to the venire panel
for the use of the United States Attorney in jury selection. 4 More recent
decisions, however, have been more approving. One court found the use
of a commercial jury service a necessary concomitant of the right to chal-
lenge jurors." Although the service telephoned neighbors and friends of
the prospective juror to obtain personal information, the court refused to
find that the acts "would normally have a tendency to intimidate the
juror."" One district judge justified his refusal to ask a submitted ques-
tion on voir dire by citing the availability of a juror investigation service
in the district.17 Furthermore, appellate courts have not disapproved of
juror investigations by the government. Courts have found no impro-
priety in the use by a United States Attorney of F.B.I. reports, 8 special
reports prepared by the Internal Revenue Service," or a jury book con-
taining information on how particular jurors had voted in previous
trials." In addition, when requested to do so, the courts have refused to
grant defendants access to the government's information.41
The loss of the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury
34. Gideon v. United States, 52 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1931).
35. Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 971 (1956).
36. 224 F.2d at 431.
37. Kiernan v. VanSchaik, 347 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1965). The appellate
court found the judge's reasoning erroneous and reversed.
38. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
939 (1951); Christoffel v. United States, 171 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on
other grounds, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
39. United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. dended, 357 U.S. 937
(1958). One of the appellant's contentions was that the government had violated the
confidential nature of income tax returns. The court held that the appellant, who
had been convicted of income tax evasion, did not have standing to complain of the
inspection of jurors' tax returns.
40. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 916 (1959). Although the United States Attorney had testified that the jury
book contained only information obtained in open court, the judge's in camera exam-
ination of the book revealed a number of reports about the behavior of individual jurors
in the jury room.
41. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 939 (1951); Christoffel v. United States, 171 F.2d 1004, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
reV'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
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is inevitable where his ability to intelligently challenge jurors is made
dependent upon his ability to match the information-gathering capacity of
the federal government. The United States Attorney's investigative ad-
vantages are overwhelming.
In the place of private detective agencies or investigation ser-
vices the Government has available the vast resources of its law
enforcement and crime detection network. In the place of ran-
dom notation by individual attorneys in a jury book, the Govern-
ment has the benefit of continuous recording by all of its
counsel, uninterrupted by the passage of time.42
The F.B.I. and the Internal Revenue Service have access to information
beyond the reach of any private investigator. Individuals and institutions
are likely to refuse information to a private detective which they would
willingly reveal to a government agent. While private investigators may
be subject to court punishment for improper conduct, there are no prac-
tical limitations upon the government's investigatory practices.48
REFORMING VOIR DIRE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The serious inadequacies of court-conducted voir dire could be
remedied with only minor reforms by the Judicial Conference.44 The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the rules of the individual dis-
tricts could be amended to prohibit gathering any information about pro-
spective jurors outside the courtroom. Perhaps the most effective
means of discouraging investigations would be to withhold lists of jurors
from the parties until the time of trial,4" except in cases where disclosure
is required by statute.46 Rules which attempt to prohibit the government
from using outside information sources may be extremely difficult to en-
42. Okun, supra note 7, at 852 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at 853. Although government investigations are theoretically subject
to supervision, the government's investigatory improprieties are not effectively con-
trolled for a number of reasons. The public is less likely to bring complaints about
governmental investigatory practices to the attention of law enforcement agencies.
While such agencies may regularly police private investigations, there is no govern-
mental agency to police the F.B.I. or the United States Attorney's office. Courts
will be reluctant to prohibit government investigations because of the difficulty of
framing such orders without proscribing legitimate investigations.
44. Since appellate review cannot produce voir dire reform, see text accompany-
ing notes 17-23 supra, affirmative action would be needed to accomplish the suggested
changes.
45. Some jurisdictions currently have district rules or standing court orders
which require that lists of prospective jurors be withheld. Stone v. United States,
324 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hamer v. United
States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916 (1959).
46. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970).
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force." A potentially effective means of reducing, if not wholly elimin-
ating, governmental investigations of veniremen would be to amend the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to curtail or eliminate the govern-
ment's right to make peremptory challenges.48 If prohibition of investi.
gations or elimination of peremptory challenges is unsuccessful, the courts
could require the government to disclose to the defendant all its outside
information about prospective jurors before the time of jury selection.
The federal courts, through the Judicial Conference, could articulate
clear policy statements about the type of questioning appropriate in the
voir dire" as well as specific lists of model questions to be used in most
criminal trials and lists of special questions appropriate to trials for par-
ticular crimes" or for particular categories of defendants, such as blacks
or political activists."' In order to make appellate review effective, the
Conference should urge that the entire voir dire proceedings, including
any questions submitted by counsel which the court declined to ask, be
preserved in the record and that appellate courts report in detail the nature
of the voir dire proceedings which they consider. Pre-trial conferences
could be used as an opportunity for the court and the parties to agree on
47. See note 43 supra & text accompanying.
48. Refusing the prosecution the right to challenge jurors peremptorily is not
as drastic a measure as it may appear. The presumption of innocence entitles the
prosecution only to twelve jurors, each of whom, at the outset of the trial, is con-
vinced of the defendant's innocence. Charles R. Garry argues that the prosecution
should not be entitled to peremptory challenges under any circumstances and pre-
sents historical evidence that peremptory challenges were developed solely for the
benefit of the defendant. Garry, Attacking Racism in Court Before Trial, in MINI-
MIZING RAcis,\i, supra note 7, at xxiii; Stender, Appellate Brief on Jury Selection, in
MINIMIZING RAcISm, supra note 7, at 240-41.
49. Such policies might, for example, encourage use of specific, objective, open-
ended questions rather than general, subjective questions capable of being answered
by a simple affirmative or negative response. Questions which use hypothetical state-
ments to attempt to precommit a juror to a verdict could be prohibited. Questioning
of individual jurors out of the presence of other prospective jurors might be called
for when the responses would have a tendency to prejudice, as would responses about
pretrial publicity. Questions posed to individual jurors might be preferred over
questions directed to the panel as a whole.
50. This should not be a difficult task since only limited categories of crimes
are tried in the federal courts. Thus, questions about experiences with stolen cars
would be appropriate in prosecutions under the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-13 (1970),
while questions about experiences with the Internal Revenue Service would be appro-
priate in tax prosecutions.
51. The Supreme Court has directed that questions about racial prejudice must
be asked when a black person is on trial. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308
(1931). The Seventh Circuit has suggested that where the defendant has an unusual
political belief, appearance, or life style, questions should probe juror attitudes towards
such nonconformity. United States v. Dellinger, - F.2d - , 12 Crim. L. Rep.
2193, 2194-95 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 1972). But cf. Ham v. South Carolina, - U.S.
-, 93 S. Ct. 848 (1973) (attitudes towards defendant's beard need not be probed in
state prosecution).
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the extent of the voir dire and to predetermine which portions of the
questioning should be done by the court and which by the parties.
Where informality is most likely to induce candor, attorney questioning
can be used. Counsel are probably also better suited to handle the voir
dire where probing, follow-up questions may be needed. If a case demands
either questioning of a personal nature which might tend to offend a juror
or unusually lengthy questioning which might irritate a juror, it is better
for the judge to do the questioning. Where the guidelines are clearly
understood in advance, the voir dire procedure should be considerably
expedited and the danger of counsel abuses considerably minimized.
Where appropriate, trial judges should also consider substituting
sworn questionnaires for oral examination.' Written questionnaires
could cover many of the same areas of inquiry, be more comprehensive
and point out areas where further in-court questioning would be useful.
Questionnaires have the added advantages of not requiring the use of
court time and the possibility of inducing greater candor where jurors
are not under the pressure of oral interrogation. Completed questionnaires
should be made available to the attorneys for inspection prior to the begin-
ning of the oral voir dire so that counsel may suggest more probing ques-
tions. Juror privacy can be protected by destroying the questionnaires
once they are no longer needed and by prohibiting the attorneys from
making any permanent record of information obtained from them. How-
ever, any portions of the questionnaire which might be relevant on appeal
should be preserved for in camera use by the appellate court. Adoption
of these reforms will enable courts to achieve the constitutional goal of
impartiality without placing undue burdens of time or expense upon the
judicial system.
LAURA COOPER
52. While questionnaires are currently required in many jurisdictions, they
average only one page in length and seek relatively little information. Existing ques-
tionnaires are only designed to obtain information about physical, mental and legal
qualifications for jury service, rather than information which could indicate a juror's
suitability for a particular case. Okun, supra note 7, at 845-46.
